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THE LAWYER-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Ralph C. Thomas*
It is one of the lawyer's proudest possessions and sternest obli-
gations that he is the recipient and preserver of his client's secrets.
These confidences embrace admissions of conduct merely shameful or
foolish; business secrets of value; and frank disclosure of past criminal
conduct of which the client is or may stand charged. But none may
be disclosed by the lawyer.
The system is not without its strains. It takes a measure of dis-
cipline to maintain silence about interesting conduct. It seems fair to
say that a good deal of conversation is laden with talk about others.
If spiteful, we are inclined to label it gossip, if not, then merely good
anecdotal discourse. Every lawyer must have experienced some meas-
ure of frustration in saying nothing with reference to someone about
whom he knows everything or remaining silent on business matters
when his knowledge, if disclosed, would give him the appearance and
prestige of an insider. However, it is when the disclosure is about
criminal conduct that the strain is the worst and the lawyer's duty be-
comes not only irksome but paradoxical.
It becomes paradoxical precisely because the lawyer, whether he
takes the case or not, is bound to silence and must maintain it even
though the state falters in its attempt to establish what he knows to be
true. Indeed, if he is counsel for the accused it is his duty to demand
acquittal because of this lack which he could supply. There is hardly
a more singular duty attached to any profession. The lawyer is at odds
with not only the interests of all like-minded (by hypothesis, non-crim-
inal) people, but with his own private interests. The criminal preys
not only on society as a corporate entity, but each member thereof,
which by definition, includes the lawyer.
Paradoxical as the problem is seen to be, the response of most
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lawyers is uniform. The disclosure by the accused of a fact usable by
the prosecution is inviolate in the lawyer's hands. And, it is safe to
say that many a lawyer has aided his client's acquittal by his non-dis-
closure of a pivotal fact of which the jury has remained ignorant.
Whether this phenomenon is good for society has been mooted for
centuries. Certainly the practice has had its detractors. Not the least
of these was Jeremy Bentham, educated for the Bar himself, who, after
noting the argument that if the lawyer were to be compelled to make
disclosure of these confidences, the client would cease to repose these
confidences in him said:
[Not] reposed? Well: and if it be not, wherein will consist
the mischief? The man, by the supposition is guilty; if not,
by the supposition there is nothing to betray: . ... the
client cannot have anything to fear. . . That it will often
happen in the case supposed no such confidence will be re-
posed is natural enough: . . . What, then, will be the con-
sequence? That a guilty person will not in general be able
to derive quite so much assistance from his law advisor...
as he may do at present.1
It is in the criminal sphere that the strain is especially apparent.
In civil litigation it is possible (absent an invocation of the fifth amend-
ment or similar immunity) to examine the client-opponent and to as-
certain the important truths. In criminal prosecutions that is impos-
sible. Thus in civil litigation the lawyer, possessed of his client's se-
crets, may take comfort, if any is needed, in the fact that had the op-
ponent asked the right questions, he would now know what the lawyer
knows. The lawyer's nondisclosure of secrets has not aided in a mis-
carriage of justice.
The preceding discussion has been based upon one central fact.
Our system of justice, both criminal and civil, is bottomed upon the
practice of litigants conducting their disputes by the use of impersonal
champions. For good or ill this is the choice of the common law
world. The thrust of this study will be directed toward confidence
keeping activities not related to the actual trial of disputes and those
activities which arguably exceed the lawyer's duty.
The central question, assuming a duty of allegiance expressed by
silence, is: about what facts and for what purpose must this silence
be kept? In short, what are the parameters of the lawyer's obligations
of confidence keeping.
1. J. BENTHAM, Improper Exclusions-Lawyer and Client, in 7 TNT WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAm 473 (Bowring's Ed. 1838-1843).
1974]
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As always, it is easy to define the clear middle ground. As al-
ways, it is difficult to delineate the subtle case by case boundaries as
silence shades into chicanery or, charitably, downright foolishness on
the part of counsel. The clear middle ground is the communication
containing the gravamen of the crime itself. Society has declared it
is the privilege and the duty of the lawyer to remain silent upon this
even though crime goes unpunished. This, the choice reads, is the de-
sirable course. It goes beyond the passivity of the closed legal mouth
and demands that the same mouth which cannot disclose what it knows
must demand acquittal because society, in the form of the state, does
not know as much.
What then is the problem? What dimensions does it take? How,
considering the vital choice of society, can it be overstepped? It must
be remembered that although the lawyer cannot disclose his client's
secrets, neither can he let his client perpetrate a fraud on the court
by lying. The privilege of lying is forbidden the client. The priv-
ilege of silence is one of his most precious rights. Should the former
occur the lawyer must disclose the existence of falsehood to the court.2
By inference, the least of his duties consists in telling the court that a
lie has been told, the most is to disclose the ostensible truth now that
the client has taken other ground.'
By most lay standards society's choice is little less than suicidal.
Certainly no other organism provides its enemy with an armoured
gladiator. It might well be asked if this is not enough. The answer
by at least some of the bar is to be found in the negative. Whether
their position is a defensible one or not is now under consideration.
Perhaps one of the most blatant overextensions of the duty of
counsel is to be found in the Virginia case of In re Ryder,4 a disci-
plinary proceeding against Ryder who took from his bank robber cli-
ent's safety deposit box and placed in his own a quantity of supposedly
stolen money and a sawed-off shotgun which he suspected had been
used in the bank robbery. The court distinguished between the in-
2. The oath of the Attorney in Oklahoma provides that he shall "[Do] no false-
hood or consent that any be done in court, and that if he should know of any he
will give knowledge thereof to the Judges of the Court or some one of them, that it
may be reformed;. . ." OKLA. STAT. tit. 5, § 2 (1971).
3. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETMcs, OPINIONS, No. 287 (1953). However,
this opinion seems to say that it is only the disclosure of the truth gained other than
from the client that is permissible. If gained from the client the lawyer is to
make known that the truth is not being told and then withdraw from the case.
4. 263 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Va. 1967), afrd, 381 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1967).
[Vol. 10: 130
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violability of private papers and the fact that neither the fourth nor
the fifth amendment prohibit the proper search and seizure and sub-
sequent use of the fruits or the instrumentalities of crime. It went on
to hold that the money was the fruit of the crime and that the weapon
was illegal in anyone's possession and therefore illegal in Ryder's. His
penalty was eighteen months suspension from the practice.
The lawyer has been seen, by definition, to be the antagonist of
society, in the spheres defined. However, to secrete evidence which
the government might find, and legally use against his client describes
a degree of identification with his client that far exceeds his privilege
of silence. He has now gone over from the passive to the active in
his representation. His stance is properly characterized as obstruc-
tionist rather than merely one of non-cooperation. On appeal the
court correctly described Ryder's actions as making him an "active
participant in a criminal act, ostensibly wearing the mantle of the loyal
advocate, but in reality serving as accessory after the fact."15
A case which exhibits what might be termed confusion as to the
nature of the lawyer's role in society is Hughes v. Meade.6 Hughes, a
lawyer, was contacted by a person who asked if the lawyer could be
instrumental in getting stolen property back to the police. Hughes
then called the police and asked if they wanted to recover stolen prop-
erty without involving Hughes in an investigation. Upon an affirma-
tive answer a box containing a stolen typewriter was put on the lawyer's
porch by a person he deliberately did not see. He refused to answer
as to the identity of his caller. The court, relying on the reasoning of
NLRB v. Harvey,7 characterized him as an "agent or conduit for
the delivery of property which was completely unrelated to legal rep-
resentation." The court went on to say, "While repose of confidence
in an attorney is something much to be desired, to use him as a shield
to conceal transactions involving stolen property is beyond the scope
of his professional duty and beyond the scope of the privilege."
The Washington case of State ex rel. Sowers v. Olwel0 lays bare
the lawyer's dilemma. Here, defendant was charged with killing de-
5. In re Ryder, 381 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1967).
6. 453 S.W.2d 538 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970).
7. 349 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1965). Although not definitely established, it seemed
likely that the lawyer's sole office was to hire a private detective to get information
for his client. If so, the court said, this involved no lawyering skills and the identity
of the client would not be privileged.
8. 453 S.W.2d at 542.
9. 64 Wash. 2d 828, 394 P.2d 681 (1964).
1974]
4
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 10 [1974], Iss. 1, Art. 14
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol10/iss1/14
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
cedent with a knife. Defendant's attorney came into possession of the
knife. At the coroner's inquest he refused to acknowledge that he
had the knife but did allow it to be established that if he had a knife
he had gotten it in the attorney-client relationship. He refused to obey
a subpoena duces tecum directing him to surrender the knife. Al-
though he gained reversal of the contempt citation on the invalidity of
the subpoena, the court said:
We do not, however, by so holding mean to imply that evi-
dence can be permanently withheld by the attorney under the
claim of the attorney-client privilege. Here, we must con-
sider the balancing process between the attorney-client priv-
ilege and the public interest in criminal investigation. We
are in agreement that the attorney-client privilege is appli-
cable to the knife held by appellant, but do not agree -that the
privilege warrants the attorney, as an officer of the court,
from withholding it after being properly requested to pro-
duce the same. The attorney should not be a depository
for criminal evidence (such as a knife, other weapons, stolen
property, etc.) which in itself has little, if any, material value
for the purposes of aiding counsel in the preparation of the
defense of his client's case. Such evidence given the attorney
during legal consultation for information purposes and used
by the attorney in preparing the defense of his client's case,
whether or not the case ever goes to trial, could clearly be
withheld for a reasonable period of time. It follows that
the attorney, after a reasonable period, should, as an officer
of the court, on his own motion turn the same over to the
prosecution. 10
The court goes on to point out that the state should shield from
the jury the fact that the knife was received from defendant's attorney,
reasoning that by allowing the prosecution to recover such evidence,
the public interest is served, and by refusing the prosecution an oppor-
tunity to disclose the source of the evidence, the client's privilege is
preserved and a balance is reached between these conflicting interests.
Other examples of professional overreaching have not reached the
gravity of court action, but were approved in ethics opinions. An
attorney representing a deserting husband, negotiated a settlement with
the Overseer of the Poor in a city in New Jersey upon which his client
defaulted. After ascertaining that his client could be arrested and ex-
tradited from New York, he sought and received an opinion that it was
10. 394 P.2d at 684-685.
[Vol. 10: 130
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proper for him to refuse to divulge his client's address in New York
upon request of the New Jersey authorities. 1
Another attorney for a losing defendant in a civil action refused
to disclose the location of his client whom plaintiff's attorney sought to
serve in supplementary proceedings to collect the judgment. He was
vindicated by an ethics opinion. 2 A similar opinion from the same
body defined as ethical the refusal to furnish the whereabouts of his
client although the request followed upon the repudiation of a settle-
ment negotiated by counsel and the severing of the attorney-client re-
lationship for that reason.13
It seems to this writer that the foregoing ethics opinions are wrong.
It is little short of astonishing that such views should be adopted in
ethics opinions. It would seem that the ethical views propounded by
the eminent lawyers who responded to the inquiries are an amalgam
of a distorted, but nonetheless honest view of the traditional attorney
identification with client, and the traditional American dislike of a tat-
tletale. It would seem that either explanation or defense of these ac-
tions to laymen would be impossible. The office of the attorney is to
advise his clients, and represent them in court, if need be. It seems
difficult to assert that his duty or privilege involves concealing the lo-
cation of a client, or former client, whom it is sought to bring within
the embrace of the courts for the resolution of a dispute between the
client and his antagonist.
This would seem all the more so in the case noted above where
the office of the attorney had apparently been exhausted. He had rep-
resented his client with respect to his duty toward his deserted family.
Having done so, he had performed the high function of a lawyer. Be-
ing unable to protect him from an adverse result at law, he has de-
scended to the level of aiding the deserting, and convicted, husband
in avoiding the due process of the law.
All this is even more strange because of the uniformity of cases
which hold that a lawyer cannot refuse to divulge the identity of his
client nor the fact of representation. 4 These cases, to the extent that
11. OPINIONS OF THE COMMrrIES ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF THE ASSOCIATION
OF THE BAR OF THE CrrY OF NEw YORK AND Tn NEW Yomx CouNTY IAwYHEs' Asso-
CIATION, 1956, OPinioN No. 196 (1931) [hereinafter cited as NEW YORK CoUNTY].
12. NEw YORK COUNTY, OPINION No. 97 (1928-29).
13. NEV YoRx COLNTY, OPINION No. 98 (1928-29).
14. E.g., Behrens v. Hironimus, 170 F.2d 627 (4th Cir. 1948); U.S. v. Pape, 144
F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1944); Mauch v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 555 (3d Cir. 1940); But
cf. Ex parte McDonough, 170 Cal. 230, 149 P. 566 (1918).
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they contain satisfactory discussion proceed upon the basis that so long
as the lawyer is not made to disclose the subject of communication,
nor the purpose of the communication, then in no way does his client
suffer by having his name divulged.
Perhaps the most striking of the cases forcing disclosure of the
client's name is People ex rel. Voglestein v. Warden."; Here, fifteen
defendants were brought before the grand jury, charged with violation
of gambling laws. Voglestein appeared for all fifteen. Eleven pleaded
guilty and disclaimed hiring Voglestein. Voglestein admitted he rep-
resented only one of the remaining four defendants but refused to state
his name. In the contempt proceeding that followed the court re-
viewed the law with respect to the attorney-client privilege and then,
citing authority pointed out that the rule has always been that the law-
yer must indicate who his client is in order to establish that there does
exist an attorney-client relationship saying, "Otherwise no lawyer could
ever be questioned as to any fact, since he might always claim he had
learned it from a client whose very existence he need not show."0
Feeling compelled to address the problem of self-incrimination
the court likened disclosure in this case to criminal cases where the
accused is required to put on various articles of clothing, speak, stand,
walk, and do other non-testimonial acts which may aid in establishing
guilt. The court seemed to be saying that out of the several possible
defendants, the person who actually hired the lawyer should not have
the benefit of anonymity when there is one who knows who the real
defendant is.
The court characterized the cases discussed as tending to incrimi-
nate the defendants involved and analogized the compelled disclosure
in the case before it as harmful to the client but less harmful than ex-
tension of the privilege would be to the orderly administration of jus-
tice.
The conviction was sustained on another ground as well. Noting
that the attorney-client relationship does not protect confidences where
the attorney is being used in furtherance of an illegal scheme, the court
found suspicion of just such a state of facts and said that secrecy
should be broken even if the lawyer is the ignorant dupe of the crim-
inal defendant.
15. 150 Misc. 714, 270 N.Y.S. 362 (Sup. Ct. 1934), affd mem., 242 App. Div.
611, 271 N.Y.S. 1059 (1934).
16. 270 N.Y.S. at 368.
[Vol. 10:130
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And finally the court said:
The identity of an employer or client who retains a lawyer to
act for him or for others in a civil or criminal proceeding
should not be veiled in mystery. The dangers of disclosure are
shadowy and remote; the evils of concealment are patent and
overwhelming. As between the two social policies competing
for supremacy, the choice is clear. Disclosure should be made
if we are to maintain confidence in the bar and in the adminis-
tration of justice. 17
What perhaps can properly be described as the other side of the
coin is the dilemma confronting the attorney in Baird v. Koerner.:"
Baird, a tax lawyer, consulted with accountants and lawyers for tax-
payers who were uneasy about past tax payments to the Federal gov-
ernment. He advised them to make an anonymous payment to the gov-
ernment. Baird sent the money by a cashier's check, and later refused
to disclose on whose behalf he was operating. He was vindicated
when the court took note of the fact that a disclosure of those who had
employed him would reveal the identity of the persons paying the tax.
The court posed to itself a rhetorical question as follows:
"[Could] the government require every tax attorney to reveal the name
of those clients who had consulted the attorney with respect to possible
taxes payable, so that the government could institute an investigation
of all such taxpayers?"'" It answered its own question in the negative.
It said that the names of clients are useful to the government for but
one purpose and that is to ascertain which ones think they are de-
linquent. The court envisages an immediate check on all those persons
that have consulted the tax lawyer to see if they have skeletons in their
closets which might result in tax prosecutions.
It seems fair to say that Baird v. Koerner is in direct conflict with
the first reason enunciated in People v. Warden. It would appear that
the dilemma is squarely before us with these opposing views. No
dilemma would seem to be posed with respect to a lawyer's silence
during the course of trial upon a subject vital to the opposition. As
has been said, this is a decision society has long since taken.
It is the opinion of this writer that a lawyer who shields the loca-
tion of his client in order that his client may escape process, especially
after an adverse result at trial, has clearly overstepped the bounds of
17. 270 N.Y.S. at 371.
18. 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
19. Id. at 630.
19743
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propriety. And, viewed superficially there is certainly nothing wrong
with the disclosure by the lawyer of the identity of his client.
This study ends on a note of perplexity. It seems that the Bar
faces two questions. The first of the questions is one of little moment
as compared to the second. What should be the position of the law
with respect to the lawyer acting as the intermediary between the crim-
inal element and law enforcement as in the case posed above where the
lawyer acted as a depositary for stolen goods? It would seem that
this is a worthwhile social action. Should it be an action that only a
lawyer can do? Should a lawyer lend his confidentiality to such an
action? Certainly, there is nothing in the training of a lawyer that fits
only him for such service, however well intentioned he may be. Should
the lawyer tender his services in this regard? It is submitted that as a
matter of dignity of the Bar the answer should be in the negative.
The latter question is the question posed by the difference between
the approaches of People v. Warden and Baird v. Koerner. What was
made clear in Warden was left implicit in Baird. If we are to retain
our accusatorial system of justice, if we are to place the burden of proof
of guilt on the shoulders of the state, if we are to allow those accused
of crime, both guilty and innocent, a champion, then are we not forced
to give the lawyer the confidentiality of the identity of his client?
The Baird case is particularly apt for posing such a question. Cer-
tainly, most people who consult tax lawyers have tax problems, often
criminal problems. If the lawyer must disclose the names of his wor-
ried clients will this not alert the taxing authorities to a select body for
investigation? Rather than random audit, or random investigation,
will not investigation center almost entirely on those people who have
consulted lawyers whose expertise lies in the field of advising troubled
taxpayers?
Are we not faced with the question posed by Bentham so long
ago? The concluding sentence of Bentham's analysis read in full states:
"That a guilty person will not in general be able to derive quite so
much assistance from his law advisor in the way of conserting a false
defence, as he may do at present."2 In Bentham's distorted view, the
purpose of consultation was to contrive a false defense. In what seems
to be the correct view the value of the seal on the lawyer's lips is that he
may demand acquittal for insufficient proof even though he is possessed
of information which would make the proof sufficient.
20. See note 1 supra (emphasis added).
[V'ol. 10: 130
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The social utility of Bentham's rationale is as good today as when
it was first enunciated. Society is the better off for the apprehension
of criminals. The choice posed by People v. Warden and Baird v.
Koerner must be answered in the light of the societal choices taken by
a system of jurisprudence which does not force a criminal defendant
to incriminate himself; refuses search warrants except upon satisfactory
proof of justifiable suspicion, and the like. What has been said about
tax agents checking the status of worried taxpayers consulting tax
counsel is equally applicable to prosecuting officials checking to see
what if anything is worrying those people who consult criminal lawyers.
Dare we move, even a small step away from our accusatorial system of
jurisprudence? Does not such a step lead to the erosion of freedom
which accompanies inquisatorial powers?
10
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